The Material-Fetal Conflict: The Right of a Woman to Refuse a Cesarean Section versus the State\u27s Interest in Saving the Life of the Fetus by Levy, Daniel R., Esq.
Volume 108 Issue 1 Article 6 
September 2005 
The Material-Fetal Conflict: The Right of a Woman to Refuse a 
Cesarean Section versus the State's Interest in Saving the Life of 
the Fetus 
Daniel R. Levy Esq. 
Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Family Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, 
and the Privacy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel R. Levy Esq., The Material-Fetal Conflict: The Right of a Woman to Refuse a Cesarean Section 
versus the State's Interest in Saving the Life of the Fetus, 108 W. Va. L. Rev. (2005). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ 
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research 
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
THE MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICT: THE RIGHT
OF A WOMAN TO REFUSE A CESAREAN SECTION
VERSUS THE STATE'S INTEREST IN SAVING THE
LIFE OF THE FETUS
Daniel R. Levy, Esq. *
I. IN TRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 98
II. B ACKGROUND ........................................................................................ 99
1I1. BASIS FOR REFUSING A CESAREAN SECTION UNDER THE RIGHT TO
REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY ................................................................. 100
A . R oe v. W ade ........................................................................... 100
B. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 101
C . A nalysis ................................................................................... 102
IV. BASIS FOR REFUSING A CESAREAN SECTION UNDER THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
M EDICAL TREATM ENT ...................................................................... 103
A . H istory .................................................................................... 103
B. Basis for Refusing a Cesarean Section under the Duty to
R escue .................................................................................... 107
C . A nalysis ................................................................................... 109
V. CASES INVOLVING THE REFUSAL OF TREATMENT BY PREGNANT WOMEN 110
A. Cases Leading Up to the Cesarean Section Decisions ........... 110
B. The Unique Case of the Caesarean Section ........................... 115
1. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital
A uthority ................................................................. 115
2. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical
C enter, Inc .............................................................. 116
3. In re Baby Boy Doe ................................................. 118
4. In re A .C . ................................................................ 119
VI. COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE FORCED CESAREAN ISSUE ....................... 120
V II. C ONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 124
* The Author earned his Juris Doctor with a concentration in Health Law from Seton Hall Univer-
sity School of Law in May 2004. He clerked for the Honorable Joseph P. Quinn, J.S.C. in 2004-
2005. Mr. Levy is an associate with Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C. in Newark, New Jersey. The
author would like to thank Alice Guttler, Esq., General Counsel for CentraState Healthcare Sys-
tem in Freehold, New Jersey; Professor Marc R. Poirier, Professor of Law at Seton Hall Law
School, Newark, New Jersey; and Lucas Townsend, Esq., Law Clerk to the Honorable Harold A.
Ackerman of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey for all their advice
and suggestions in the completion of this article. This article is dedicated in loving memory of my
grandmother, Margaret E. King.
1
Levy: The Material-Fetal Conflict: The Right of a Woman to Refuse a Ces
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
The maternal-fetal relationship presents unique issues for consideration
in both the healthcare field as well as in the legal arena. This relationship is
unique and creates complex issues because the fetus is completely dependent on
the pregnant woman.' Therapeutic access to the fetus can only be achieved
through the pregnant woman, and it is possible for the pregnant woman to ex-
perience negative effects from the treatment intended to benefit the fetus.2
Therefore, some women may refuse medical treatment intended to benefit the
fetus because that same treatment may be harmful to the pregnant woman.3 This
paper will focus on whether a woman may refuse such treatment, more specifi-
cally, whether a woman can refuse to undergo a Cesarean section when the dan-
gers of vaginal birth significantly outweigh the dangers of undergoing the Ce-
sarean section.
There are several legal justifications under which it can be argued that a
woman may refuse to undergo a Cesarean section. First, there is an argument
that a woman has a right to refuse a Cesarean section under the right to privacy
and the right for a woman to choose to have an abortion.4 A second argument
that a woman has a right to refuse a Cesarean section derives from the almost
absolute right for an individual to refuse medical treatment. 5 An additional ar-
gument for the right to refuse a Cesarean section is based on the right to not be
forced to rescue another.6
The refusal of a Cesarean section presents a unique question in both the
medical and legal arenas. In the medical field, the obstetrician owes a duty to
both the mother and the fetus, even though the best course of treatment for each
patient may be in direct conflict. 7 Legally, a viable fetus is completely depend-
ent on the mother, so it may limit the mother's constitutional rights, such as the
right to reproductive privacy and the right to refuse medical treatment. Even
though there are several arguments in support of a woman's right to refuse a
Cesarean section, a state should be able to require a woman to undergo a Cesar-
I AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE ON ETHICS,
ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 34 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS].
2 Id.
3 See Kirk Johnson, Harm to Fetuses Becomes Issue in Utah and Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2004, at A9. Prosecutors in Utah originally charged Melissa Ann Rowland with murder
after she refused to undergo a Cesarean section despite her doctor's urging and one of the fetuses
died as a result. The prosecutors charged that Ms. Rowland's refusal of the surgery showed "de-
praved indifference" to her twins' survival. Id.
4 See infra Part III.A.-C.
5 See infra Part IV.A.
6 See infra Part IV.B.
7 See ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS, supra note 1, at 34.
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ean section due to the special relationship formed between the mother and the
fetus by the time of viability.
II. BACKGROUND
"[A] Cesarean [section] is necessary whenever labor is unsafe for either
[the] mother or [the] fetus, when labor cannot be induced, when dystocia8 or
fetal problems present significant risks with vaginal delivery, [or] when an
emergency mandates immediate delivery."9 "The majority of [C]esareans are
performed for fetal indications [and] a few solely for maternal reasons ...."'0
Forty percent of Cesarean sections are performed due to fetal distress, breech or
other emergency conditions."
Cesareans can lead to a variety of postpartum complications, including
wound infection, hemorrhage, severe complications from anesthesia, and even
death. 12 The pregnancy related mortality rate among women with Cesarean de-
livery with a live birth outcome is about 35.9 deaths per 100,000 while the mor-
tality rate among women with vaginal delivery with a live birth outcome is
about 9.2 per 100,000.13 Previous Cesarean sections can lead to major risks in
subsequent pregnancies since there may be a higher chance of placenta previa
or placenta accreta, 14 both of which can cause severe bleeding.' 5
"When deciding whether or not vaginal delivery is prudent, the attend-
ing physician must balance the effects the route of delivery might have not only
on the pregnant woman, but also on her fetus."' 16 This balancing does not only
8 Dystocia includes any "[m]echanical problems of the uterus, fetus, or birth canal or ineffec-
tive uterine contractions that result in unsuccessful progress of labor and vaginal delivery ..
JAMES R. ScoTr ET AL., DANFORTH'S OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 450 (9th ed. 2003).
9 Id. at 449.
10 Id. at 450.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Margaret A. Harper & Robert P. Byington, Pregnancy-Related Death and Health Care
Services, 102 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 273, 275 (2003). While the mortality rate is higher for
Cesarean births, it must be remembered that the C-section is generally indicated only when there
is maternal or fetal complications, whereas vaginal births are typically performed when there are
no such complications; therefore, the patients having the Cesarean are more susceptible to death
even prior to the C-section. See id.
14 Placenta previa is defined as the condition in pregnancy where the "placenta has grown
abnormally low in the uterus, partly or completely covering the cervix." AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION COMPLETE MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 990 (1st ed. 2003). "Placenta accreta occurs
when the placenta attaches too deep in the uterine wall but does not penetrate the uterine muscle."
Pregnancy Complications: Placenta Accreta, http://www.american preg-
nancy.org/pregnancycomplications/placentaaccreta.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2005) (emphasis
added).
15 See Should I Have a Cesarean Section, 49 MIDWIFERY & WOMEN'S HEALTH 167-68 (2004).
16 JEFFREY P. PHELAN & STEVEN L. CLARK, Preface to CESAREAN DELIVERY (1988).
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include the birth itself, but also includes any negative consequences that may
occur subsequent to the birth. 17 "Once the balancing is complete, [C]esarean
delivery may be indicated for the patient, her fetus, or both."'' 8 Further compli-
cations arise from the threat of medical malpractice litigation, which may ex-
plain the radical rise in Cesarean births over the past few decades. 19 The addi-
tional risks placed on the mother when undergoing a Cesarean section may
cause more women to refuse the procedure, even if the Cesarean is indicated for
the fetus.
20
III. BASIS FOR REFUSING A CESAREAN SECTION UNDER THE RIGHT TO
REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY
A. Roe v. Wade
One argument for the right to refuse a Cesarean section is that the right
of refusal is protected by the right to reproductive privacy. The Supreme Court
has consistently held that there is a fundamental right to reproductive privacy in
the United States. 21 In Roe v. Wade,22 the Supreme Court held that a woman has
a constitutional right to an abortion under the right to privacy.23 However, the
Court held that although the right to privacy is broad enough to cover a
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, the right is not absolute.24 In the first
trimester, the woman's right to an abortion is absolute, so there can be no re-
strictions on the privacy right.25 The Court reasoned that there is no viability of
the fetus in the first trimester and that abortion may actually be safer than child-
26onbirth, so the privacy interest far outweighs the state's interests. In the second
trimester, a state has a compelling interest in protecting the health of the mother
and can regulate such things as licensing of clinics, but the doctor and mother
are free to determine whether to end the pregnancy. 27 In the third trimester, the
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See ETHICS IN OBSTETRICS, supra note 1, at 34.
21 See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 438-39 (1983)
(invalidating a statute requiring an abortion after the first trimester to be performed in a hospital
because the result was an unnecessary economic burden on a woman's right to an abortion); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that a woman's qualified right to terminate her preg-
nancy is within the right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (includ-
ing within the right to privacy the right to use contraceptives).
22 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23 Id. at 154.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 164.
26 Id.
27 Id.at 163.
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fetus is deemed viable and can live outside the womb, so the state has a compel-
ling interest in protecting life and can prohibit abortion.28
B. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
After several attempts to overturn the ruling in Roe, the Court reconsid-
ered the abortion issue by granting certiorari in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.29 In Casey, the Supreme Court focused on equal-
ity in stating that denying an abortion does not allow a woman to become fully
equal. 30 The Court set forth a three-part holding. The first part stated that a
woman has the right to choose to have an abortion pre-viability and have the
abortion without much state interference. 31 The second part held that the state
has the power to restrict abortions after viability,32 and the third part held that
the state has a legitimate interest throughout the pregnancy in protecting the
health of both the mother and the fetus. 33 In short, the Court developed a new
test, which provides that a state can regulate abortion during the pregnancy so
long as the state's regulations do not create an undue burden on the mother, and
if no undue burden is found, rational basis review will apply.34
The Court further found that a state can justify intruding into a woman's
right to privacy during the pregnancy in order to preserve the fetus' life.35 The
Court reasoned that the "[s]tate has legitimate interests from the outset of the
pregnancy in protecting.. . the life of the fetus that may become a child., 36 The
Court concluded that laws restricting abortion in the first two trimesters will be
valid as long as they do not place an undue burden on the mother.37 However,
the state can prohibit abortions once the fetus is deemed viable.
38
28 Id. at 164-65.
29 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 502 U.S. 1056, 1056-57 (1992).
30 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
31 Id. at 846.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 878. Under the rational basis test, a statute will be upheld as long as the state can
demonstrate that the means employed are reasonably related to its objective. See LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1341 (2d ed. 1988). The rational basis test is the easiest
standard for a state to meet in proving a statute's constitutional validity. See id.
35 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S.
490, 503 (1989) (stating that a state's interest in potential life is compelling at twenty weeks).
36 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
37 Id. at 876-77.
38 Id. at 879.
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C. Analysis
The argument for refusing a Cesarean section under the right to repro-
ductive privacy is that a woman has the right to terminate her pregnancy pursu-
ant to the doctrines established in Roe and Casey. Therefore, it would allow for
a woman to refuse a life-saving Cesarean section because she would legally be
permitted to terminate the pregnancy instead of undergoing the Cesarean sec-
tion. However, this argument is misplaced as the right to undergo an abortion is
not absolute and can be regulated as long as the fetus is found to be viable.
Under the reasoning established in Roe, a state could force a woman to
undergo a Cesarean section as long as the fetus has been deemed viable. Since
the right to terminate the pregnancy is not absolute and because the viable fetus
could live outside the womb, the state has a compelling interest in protecting the
life of the fetus. Therefore, the argument for refusing a Cesarean section under
the holding in Roe fails because the state's interest outweighs the woman's in-
terests at the time the Cesarean section would be performed.
Although the Casey decision removed the trimester consideration from
its analysis, the Supreme Court's decision in Casey does not provide any further
basis for a woman to refuse a Cesarean section. Again, the Cesarean section
would normally be performed only during the latter part of the pregnancy, after
it has been determined that the fetus is viable. Once viability is determined, the
state has a significant interest in protecting the life of the fetus. It follows that a
woman cannot refuse a Cesarean section by simply citing a right to reproductive
privacy because the woman's interests are outweighed by the state's interest in
protecting the life of the fetus. Therefore, under an analysis using reproductive
privacy rights, the state's interest in protecting the fetus far outweighs the
woman's right to refuse a Cesarean section.
However, the analysis cannot end under reproductive privacy rights, as
refusing a C-section is inherently different from an abortion. In most Cesarean
refusal cases, the potential mother does not intend to abort the pregnancy. She
does, however, refuse to undergo an intrusive surgery in order to deliver the
baby. In the abortion cases, on the other hand, it is the intent of the woman to
end the pregnancy and not deliver the fetus. Therefore, the issue of Cesarean
section refusal must be analyzed under whether the procedure is generally one
included under the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment.
[Vol. 108
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IV. BASIS FOR REFUSING A CESAREAN SECTION UNDER THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
MEDICAL TREATMENT
A. History
The right to refuse medical treatment has been generally accepted
throughout every jurisdiction. 39 The Supreme Court has held that each person
has a constitutional right to make healthcare decisions, including the right to
refuse medical treatment.40 Therefore, if state law requirements are met 4 a per-
son may express his wishes about termination of medical treatment or appoint a
surrogate to make the decision for him.4 2 In order to comply with state laws,
documents known as living wills have been created, which contain directives
concerning termination of medical treatment if the individual no longer has the
capacity to make the medical decision. 3
Competent patients have a right to refuse medical treatment in end-of-
life decisions."a State interests are not enough to overcome individual rights in
refusing medical treatment, and the interests of third parties are also not enough
39 See, e.g., Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 158 (Cal. 2001) (holding that "[a]
competent adult has the right under the common law and the state constitution's privacy clause to
refuse medical treatment, even treatment necessary to sustain life"); DeGrella v. Elston, 858
S.W.2d 698, 709 (Ky. 1993) (holding that a mother could order the discontinuance of life-
sustaining treatments in light of a medical finding that the patient's condition was irreversible); In
re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 449 (Wash. 1987) (holding that "the right to refuse life
sustaining treatment is not a mere creation of statute" but rather "stems from both the constitu-
tional right of privacy and the common law right to be free of bodily invasion"); Rasmussen v.
Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (Ariz. 1987) (holding that the doctrine of informed consent and the
state constitution permits an individual to refuse medical treatment); John F. Kennedy Mem'l
Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984) (holding that, in the cases of a termi-
nally ill person with a living will in effect, the guardian need not obtain court approval before
terminating life-support systems); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) (relying upon
Roe, the court recognized a terminally ill woman's right to privacy and allowed the discontinu-
ance of her artificial life support).
40 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
41 Id. at 284 (holding that a State may require clear and convincing evidence in order to refuse
medical treatment).
42 JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 403-404 (6th
ed. 2000).
43 See Bretton J. Horttor, A Survey of Living Will and Advanced Health Care Directives, 74
N.D. L. REV. 233, 233 (1998).
44 See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304 (Cal. App. 1986) (holding that the
decision to refuse treatment is the sole decision of the competent adult, not a conditional right
subject to approval by ethics committees or courts of law); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617,
624 (Nev. 1990) (holding that a patient's right to refuse treatment overrode the state's interest in
preserving life); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 423 (N.J. 1987) (holding that medical choices "are not
to be decided by societal standards of reasonableness or normalcy" rather "it is the patient's pref-
erences-formed by his or her unique personal experiences-that should control").
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to overcome the individual's interests.45 A competent adult has the right to re-
fuse any medical treatment, even treatment that may save or prolong her life.
46
Courts have allowed individuals to refuse medical attention even if the compe-
tent patient requests removal of something such as a feeding tube necessary to
keep the individual alive.47
One of the more extreme examples of the courts upholding a refusal of
medical treatment is found in In re Quinlan.48 On April 15, 1975, Karen Quinlan
stopped breathing for at least two fifteen minute periods. 49 Ms. Quinlan lapsed
into a coma and a respirator was attached in order to ventilate her lungs. 50 The
medical testimony revealed that Ms. Quinlan did have some brain function and
therefore was not brain dead.51 Ms. Quinlan's father petitioned the court to be
appointed her guardian in order to authorize the discontinuance of all life-
sustaining medical devices:
The New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed the application to be ap-
pointed guardian and remove life-sustaining measures under the right to pri-
vacy. 53 The court stated that the interests of the State are "the preservation and
sanctity of human life and defense of the right of the physician to administer
medical treatment according to his best judgment., 54 The court found that Ms.
Quinlan's independent right of choice would outweigh the interests of the State;
however, in this case, the court could not discern her supposed choice since she
was grossly incompetent and did not present enough credible evidence through
discussions with friends that she would have refused treatment. Nevertheless,
the court held that Karen's right of privacy could be asserted on her behalf by
her guardian, and therefore life-sustaining medical treatment could be with-
held.56
45 See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,664-65 (N.J. 1976).
46 See id. at 663.
47 See id. at 663-64.
48 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
49 Id. at 653-54.
50 Id. at 654-55.
51 Id. at 654.
52 Id. at 651.
53 Id. at 662-63.
54 Id. at 663.
55 Id. at 664.
56 Id.
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In re Schiavo57 is another more recent example of a court following a
patient's wishes to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Ms. Schiavo was in a per-
sistent vegetative state as a result of cardiac arrest and as a result only had func-
tion of her brain stem. 8 The medical evidence concluded that since Ms.
Schiavo's brain stem was functioning, she could control basic life functions
such as breathing and heartbeat, but she was unaware of her surroundings and
was incapable of thought.59
The Schiavo case gained national attention because Ms. Schiavo did not
have a living will, yet the court found that her oral statements to her friends and
family were sufficiently clear and convincing evidence that she would have re-
fused life-sustaining treatment.60 Additionally, Ms. Schiavo did not require life-
saving treatment, such as a ventilator, but she did require feeding and hydration
via a feeding tube.61 Therefore, the Schiavo case is an example of the willing-
ness of courts to follow the wishes of the individual in right to refuse medical
treatment cases because the treatment to be withheld was nutrition, which many
consider maintenance and not treatment. Additionally, the court found certain
statements made to friends as clear and convincing evidence even though there
was no living will.
Although the right to refuse medical treatment may seem to be absolute,
the right to refuse medical treatment has been limited in two significant areas
that may restrict the rights of a pregnant woman to refuse treatment. First, the
living will statute of virtually every state contains a pregnancy exception, which
states that the provisions of the living will authorizing the discontinuation of
live-saving measures do not apply when the patient is pregnant.62 "A number of
states with living will statutes have determined that the right to refuse medical
treatment, or the right to bodily integrity, carries less weight when the individual
asserting the right is pregnant. '63 The pregnancy clauses "automatically invali-
57 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). The Terri Schiavo case gained national attention
in 2005 after the state court entered an order forcing the removal of Ms. Schiavo's feeding tube
and Congress reconvened during the Easter break to pass legislation for the case to be heard by a
federal judge and President Bush cut short a vacation to come back to Washington to sign the law.
The federal courts subsequently denied all appeals filed by Ms. Schiavo's parents. See Daniel
Eisenberg, Lessons of the Schiavo Battle, TIME, Apr. 4, 2005, at 24-25.
58 Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 26.
59 Id.
60 In re Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 180.
61 Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So.2d 321, 325 (Fla. 2004).
62 See, e.g., ALA. CODE 5 22-8A-4(e) (2004); ALASKA STAT. 5 18.12.040(c) (2004); COLO.
REV. STAT. 5 15-18-104(2) (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. 5 19a-574 (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
5 2503(j) (2003); GA. CODE ANN. 5 31-32-3(b) (2002); IDAHO CODE ANN. 5 39-4504 (2004); IOWA
CODE ANN. 8 144A.6 (West 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 145B.13(3) (West 2005); Mo. ANN. STAT.
5 459.025 (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. 5 449.624(4) (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 137-H: 14
(2005); S.C. CODE ANN. 5 44-77-70 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 75-2-1109 (2004).
63 See Molly C. Dyke, Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will
Statutes, 70 B.U. L. REV. 867, 868 (1990).
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date the living will during the course of the patient's pregnancy in order to pro-
tect the life of the fetus." ' In effect, a pregnancy clause restricts the right to
die.65 States that have enacted pregnancy clauses have effectively determined
that the state's interest in protecting the fetus outweighs the patient's right to
determine whether to forgo medical treatment.
66
The right to refuse medical treatment is also not absolute in the situation
where a parent refuses medical treatment for his or her minor child. "[P]arents
generally have authority to make medical decisions ...about life-sustaining
medical treatment on behalf of their children., 67 "The child's lack of decision-
making capacity precludes the adoption of a standard based solely on the child's
wishes. '68 However, if the parental decision places the child in harm, courts
may review the parental decision by looking at the best interests of the child.69
"As the best interests standard suggests, parents will be denied authority to re-
fuse life-sustaining treatment in some situations.,
70
The classic cases of parents refusing life-sustaining treatment involve
"families of Jehovah's Witnesses where the children need blood transfusions
and their parents decline the transfusions on religious grounds.' In those cases,
the courts have held that the children must be given the transfusions. 72 In order-
ing treatment, courts typically cite Prince v. Massachusetts,73 where the Su-
preme Court stated, "[p]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it
does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of
64 Id. at 868-69.
65 Id. at 869.
66 Id. at 870.
67 WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHics 642 (5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter
HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS].
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (Ga. 1984) (stating that in cases of suspected
neglect or abuse or when parents assume a stance which in any way endangers the child, the par-
ents' right to speak for the child may be lost). See also In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1979) (stating factors to consider in determining the best interest of a child as "the seri-
ousness of the harm the child is suffering or the substantial likelihood that he will suffer serious
harm; the evaluation for the treatment by the medical profession; the risks involved in medically
treating the child; and the expressed preferences of the child").
70 HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHics, supra note 67.
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411, 412 (Mass. 1991) (eight-year-old child needed a
blood transfusion as part of treatment for acute leukemia); In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114, 1120
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (six-year-old child with sickle cell anemia who had already suffered two
strokes needed weekly blood transfusions over at least a year's time to reduce the risk of a recur-
rence of her strokes from 70% to 10%). But see In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 328 (Ill. 1989) (al-
lowing a minor to make the decision to refuse a blood transfusion for religious reasons because
the court determined that mature minors enjoy a right to.refuse life-sustaining medical treatment).
73 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that the First Amendment freedom of religion does not allow
a parent to have her children distribute religious articles on a highway if the distribution places the
children in danger of being harmed).
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their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when
they can make that choice for themselves. 74 The Court further held that a state
may infringe upon religious freedom if it protects a child against some clear and
present danger.75 As Prince indicates, the theory of denying parents authority to
refuse treatment in some situations is that "children must be given an opportu-
nity to reach adulthood to decide for themselves which religious [beliefs] they
will follow.
76
In summary, the law regarding the right to refuse medical treatment is
almost absolute. However, two major exceptions exist that both protect children
and fetuses. These two areas of law show a distinct policy of protecting children
and fetuses from parental decisions that may harm the child or fetus. Therefore,
a pregnant woman cannot claim she has a right to refuse a Cesarean section
based upon the right to refuse medical treatment because the refusal of treatment
takes place at a stage when the right to refuse is not absolute. The right to refuse
is not absolute because refusal would cause harm to the fetus, and therefore, the
state's interest in protecting the fetus outweighs any right to refuse medical
treatment.
B. Basis for Refusing a Cesarean Section under the Duty to Rescue
Another argument for the right to refuse a Cesarean section is derived
from the doctrine that there is no duty to rescue.77 There is generally no duty to
78 7
rescue in American jurisprudence. In Harper v. Herman,79 the court enunci-
ated the general rule that a person has no duty to rescue, but also stated that
there is an exception to the general rule when a special relationship exists be-
tween the parties. 80 The Harper court defined special relationship as giving rise
to a legal duty to protect another where one person has "custody of another per-
son under circumstances in which that other person is deprived of normal oppor-
tunities of self-protection.' Other courts have held that there is a duty to rescue
in situations where aid is voluntarily started or there is a pre-existing relation-
ship between the parties.82
74 Id. at 170.
75 Id. at 167.
76 CURRAN, supra note 67, at 643.
77 See Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993).
78 Brown v. Pa. Dep't of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 477 (3d
Cir. 2003) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 323 (1965)).
79 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 See Rhodes v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 665 N.E.2d 1260, 1270 (111. 1996) (stating that the law
imposes no duty to rescue an injured stranger upon one who did not cause the injury, but a duty
may arise when a special relationship exists between the parties); Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d
217, 220-22 (Mich. 1976) (holding that there is a duty to rescue when there is a special relation-
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The general rule of one's right not to be compelled to rescue has been
used in cases where an individual seeks to force another to donate an organ or
bone marrow.83 An individual generally has no duty to donate an organ or bone
marrow to another, even if it will save another's life.
84
In In re Richardson,85 the plaintiff filed suit against his wife, as mother
of their minor child, to compel her to consent to surgical removal and transplan-
tation of one of the boy's kidneys for donation to the boy's sister.86 The plaintiff
alleged that the boy's sister would die within a matter of months without the
kidney transplant. 87 The court held that the boy could not be compelled to do-
nate since the individual has a "right to be free in his person from bodily intru-
sion. 8
8
Likewise, in McFall v. Shimp,89 the plaintiff suffered from "a rare bone
marrow disease and the prognosis for his survival [was] very [slim], unless he
receive[d] a bone marrow transplant from a compatible donor."90 After an ex-
tensive search, the defendant was found to be the only suitable donor.91 The
defendant refused to donate the bone marrow, so the plaintiff filed suit to com-
pel the defendant to submit to the bone marrow transplant.92
The court began its discussion by stating that "[t]he common law has
consistently held to a rule which provides that one human being is under no
legal compulsion to give aid or to take action to save another human being or to
rescue." 93 The court further stated that "[o]ur society, contrary to many others,
has as its first principle, the respect for the individual, and that society and gov-
ship between the parties as well as when aid is voluntarily started); Gilger v. Hernandez, 997 P.2d
305, 310 (Utah 2000) (holding that a person generally has no duty to protect another from harm
unless a special relationship exists between the parties).
83 See McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1978).
84 See In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that a minor cannot
be compelled to donate a kidney to his sister); McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 92 (holding that an
individual is under no duty to donate bone marrow to another even if it will save that person's
life). But see Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Ky. 1969) (allowing the parents of an in-
competent person to decide to have the incompetent individual donate his kidney to a sibling
because the operation would benefit the incompetent individual).
85 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
86 Id. at 185-86. The mother actually consented, but the suit was used as a procedural vehicle
to produce the matter before the court. Id. at 186.
87 Id. at 186.
88 Id. at 187.
89 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1978).
90 Id. at 90.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 91.
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emiment exist to protect the individual from being invaded and hurt by an-
other."
94
For our law to compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of
his body would change every concept and principle upon
which our society is founded. To do so would defeat the
sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule which
would know no limits, and one could not imagine where the
line would be drawn.95
The court, therefore, denied the request for the preliminary injunction to order
the defendant to undergo the transplant.
96
C. Analysis
The right to refuse medical treatment is derived from the notion of one's
own bodily integrity and the right not to be forced to undergo bodily intrusions.
This is derived from the law of informed consent, which asks whether a patient
was led into a procedure or medical decision without consent or with inadequate
consent.97 The doctrine of informed consent is based on the law of battery since
a surgeon who performs a surgery without informed consent may be guilty of a
battery.98 Because a Cesarean section is an invasive medical procedure, on the
surface it would appear that a woman could refuse to undergo the procedure.
The right to refuse to donate organs is also based on the notion that
"courts do not compel one person to permit a significant intrusion upon his or
her bodily integrity for the benefit of another person's health."99 This set of
cases simply explains that if a person can refuse medical treatment that will save
his or her own life, he or she can certainly refuse medical treatment that may
save another's life. °° This law is based on the fact that there is generally no
duty to rescue in American jurisprudence. °10 A woman could certainly argue
that she has no duty to rescue the baby because there is no right to compel her to
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 92.
97 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Schloendorff v.
Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (stating that the premise of the informed con-
sent case is the concept that "[elvery human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body")); Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 103-04
(Ind. 1992).
98 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783.
99 In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1243-44 (D.C. 1990).
100 Id.
101 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 323 (1965).
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undergo a significant bodily intrusion, i.e. Cesarean section, for the benefit of
another's health, i.e. the baby.
The Cesarean section analysis, however, cannot simply end with a dis-
cussion of the right not to donate organs. The difference is that the woman has
become pregnant and chosen not to abort the pregnancy. Therefore, the fetus is
completely dependent on the mother, so the fetus' situation is different because
there is a special relationship between the mother and the fetus. This special
relationship develops into a duty for the mother to undergo a Cesarean section.
However, this duty does not exist in the organ donation cases. The argument has
been raised that a woman would have a duty to donate an organ to a child she
has given birth to because there would still be a duty to save the child. 0 2 How-
ever, there would be no such a duty in this situation because after birth the child
is no longer completely dependent on the mother as the fetus is dependent in
utero.10 3 It is a result of this complete dependence that develops the special rela-
tionship between the mother and fetus and subsequently a duty for the mother to
undergo a Cesarean section.
V. CASES INVOLVING THE REFUSAL OF TREATMENT BY PREGNANT WOMEN
A. Cases Leading Up to the Cesarean Section Decisions
Only four appellate level courts have decided the issue on whether a
woman can refuse to undergo a Cesarean section. These four courts have split
on the issue and none of the courts have provided a full and coherent analysis
for the specific issue of a woman refusing a Cesarean section. Some of the
courts have analyzed the issue under Roe and reproductive rights while the oth-
ers have concentrated on the right to refuse medical treatment or the right to not
save another's life. However, none of the courts have considered the fact that
the situation cannot be fully analyzed specifically under one area of law. In-
stead, courts should more fully analyze the special relationship that has formed
between the mother and fetus at the time of viability.
Even though only a few appellate level courts have decided the precise
issue of whether a woman can refuse a Cesarean section, several courts have
encountered issues that seem to suggest the direction a certain jurisdiction may
be heading if faced with the Cesarean issue. In In re Jamaica Hospital,1°4 a
"patient was [eighteen] weeks pregnant and had refused a blood transfusion
necessary to stabilize her condition and save the life of the unborn child."10 5
102 China Batista, R.N., raised this argument that if a woman has a duty to undergo a Cesarean
section in order to save the fetus, she should also have a duty to donate an organ while the child is
a minor if it were the only way to save the child's life.
103 In utero defines the state of the fetus while it is still in the mother's womb. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 842 (8th ed. 2004).
104 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
105 Id. at 899.
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The patient refused the blood transfusion based on her religious beliefs. 10 6 Ac-
cording to one of the doctors treating the patient, both she and the fetus would
die without the blood transfusion. 0 7 The court stated that the patient "has an
important and protected interest in the exercise of her religious beliefs.' 0 8 The
court further stated that if the patient's life were the only one involved, the court
would not interfere.1
09
The court concluded that even though the fetus was not yet viable and
that the state's interest in protecting the life of the fetus would be less than
"compelling" in the context of the abortion cases, the state did have a highly
significant interest in protecting the life of a mid-term fetus. 0 The state's inter-
est in protecting the life of the mid-term fetus outweighs the patient's right to
refuse a blood transfusion on religious grounds." I
The New York Court of Appeals came to a different conclusion in Fos-
mire v. Nicoleau,"2 where the patient refused blood transfusions necessary to
save her life after she gave birth to a child. 1 3 The state attempted to force the
woman to undergo the blood transfusions, but the woman refused on religious
grounds."l 4 The court stated that "a competent adult has the right to determine
the course of his or her own medical treatment, and may decline even lifesaving
measures, in the absence of a superior state interest."' 15 The state argued that it
had a substantial interest in protecting a minor child from the loss of the
mother. 16 The patient argued that compelling her to submit to blood transfu-
sions "violated her common-law, statutory and constitutional right to make her
own medical decisions as well as her constitutional right to practice her religion
free of government interference."' 17
The court held that the patient had a personal common-law and statutory
right to refuse medical treatment. 1 8 However, the court stated that the right is
not absolute and may have to yield to superior state interests under certain cir-
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. (citing In re Melideo, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding that because
the patient was fully competent, not pregnant and had no children, her refusal to submit to a blood
transfusion must be upheld, even though it might be necessary to save her life)).
"o Id. at 900.
III Id.
112 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990).
113 Id. at 77-78.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 78.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 79.
118 Id. at 80-81.
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cumstances." 9 Other courts have also found that the state's interest in preserv-
ing life may outweigh the patient's interests.120
The Fosmire court further stated that the "[s]tate has a well-recognized
interest in protecting and preserving the lives of its citizens., 121 The court stated
that "a distinction should be drawn between the [s]tate's interest in protecting
the lives of its citizens from injuries by third parties, and injuries resulting from
the individual's own actions.' 22 The state's interest is manifest, and the state
can generally be expected to intervene when the individual's conduct threatens
injuries to others. 123
In In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 24 attorneys
for Georgetown Hospital applied for an emergency writ seeking permission to
administer blood transfusions to an emergency patient. 25 The attending physi-
cians stated that the transfusions were necessary in order to save the patient's
life, but the patient and her husband refused based on their religious beliefs.
126
The patient was not pregnant but was the mother of a seven-month-old child at
home. 127 The court cited the reasoning in Prince, supra, stating that "[t]he right
to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or
the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death."'128 The
court concluded that the state, as parens patriae,29 will not allow a parent to
abandon a child, and so it should not allow the most ultimate of voluntary aban-
donments. 130 The court ordered the patient to undergo the blood transfusion,
reasoning that the patient had a responsibility to the community for the care of
119 Id. at 81.
120 See, e.g., In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 96-97 (N.H. 1984) (permitting the state to forcibly feed
a prisoner, citing concerns about institutional order); Von Holden v. Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623,
627 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (holding that the obligation of the state to protect the health and wel-
fare of persons in its care and custody and its interest in preservation of life outweigh any right of
privacy or self-expression).
121 Fosmire, 551 N.E.2d at 81.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
125 Id. at 1001.
126 Id. at 1002. See also In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 n.1 (N. Y.
Sup.Ct. 1990) (noting the common scripture quotes for the refusal of blood transfusions) (citing
Genesis 9:3-4 ["Only flesh with its soul - its blood - you must not eat."]; Leviticus 17:13-14
["[You must] pour its blood out and cover it with dust."]; Acts 15:19-21 ["Abstain from... forni-
cation and from what is strangled and from blood"]).
127 In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1006.
128 Id. at 1008 (quoting Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944)).
129 Parens patriae is defined as "the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those un-
able to care for themselves." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
130 In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1008.
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her infant, and therefore, the state had an interest in preserving the life of the
mother.
131
In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson,132 the
hospital brought an action seeking authority to administer blood transfusions to
a patient who was over thirty-two weeks pregnant.133 The New Jersey Supreme
Court concluded that the fetus was viable because the patient was beyond thirty-
two weeks pregnant. 134 The patient refused the transfusions as they were con-
trary to her religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness. 135 The court found that the
unborn child was entitled "to the law's protection and that an appropriate order
should be made to insure blood transfusions to the mother in the event that they
are necessary in the opinion of the physician in charge at the time."'136 The court
reasoned that "the welfare of the child and the mother are so intertwined and
inseparable that it would be impracticable to attempt to distinguish between
them .... ,,137
In In re Dubreuil,138 the patient was admitted to the hospital in an "ad-
vanced stage" of pregnancy.' 39 The physicians determined that the patient
needed to undergo a Cesarean section, which she consented to, but she did not
consent to the transfusion of blood based on her religious beliefs as a Jehovah's
Witness. 140 The physicians subsequently delivered the baby via Cesarean sec-
tion.141
Because the patient had lost a significant amount of blood and she had a
severe blood condition preventing her blood from clotting properly, the attend-
ing physicians contacted the patient's estranged husband, who subsequently
consented to the blood transfusion. 142 The hospital obtained a declaratory judg-
ment allowing it to continue to administer the blood. 143 The trial court reasoned
that the interests of the state outweighed the patient's interests because there
was no indication as to how the patient's four minor children would be cared for
if she died.144
131 Id. at 1008-09.
132 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964).
133 Id. at 537.
134 See id. at 538.
135 Id. at 537-38.
136 Id. at 538.
137 Id.
138 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993).
139 Id. at 820.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 820-821.
142 Id. at 821.
143 Id.
144 Id.
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The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the district court's decision. 45
The court found that "[t]he state has a duty to assure that a person's wishes re-
garding medical treatment are respected."' 46 However, the court found that the
protection of innocent third parties could be considered in determining whether
to give force to a patient's right to refrain from medical treatment. 47 The court
stated that "the state['s] interest in maintaining a home with two parents for the
minor children does not override a patient's constitutional rights of privacy and
religion to refuse a potentially lifesaving blood transfusion.
' 4 8
The patient argued that the court should completely eliminate any con-
sideration of state interest in protecting innocent third parties from abandon-
ment. 49 However, the court refused to rule out the possibility that cases may
present a compelling interest to prevent abandonment.150
In Taft v. Taft,15! the patient had three previous children born after the
mother had a "purse string" operation. 52 One other pregnancy, during which no
purse string was performed, terminated in the seventh month. 53 The patient was
in the fourth month of her pregnancy and without the purse string operation it
was probable that she would miscarry. 154 The wife was a "born-again Christian"
and, based on her religious beliefs, refused to have the operation.1 55
The court concluded that the wife's religious beliefs combined with her
right to privacy outweighed any circumstances so compelling as to justify cur-
tailing the wife's constitutional rights. 156 The court concentrated on the fact that
the record was devoid of any facts that would support the wife to submit to an
operation against her consent. 157 However, the court stated that there might be
145 Id. at 828.
146 Id. at 822 (quoting In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 13-14 (Fla. 1990)).
147 Id.
148 Id. at 825-26. See also In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 376 (D.C. 1972) (approving trial
court's refusal to appoint a guardian to consent to blood transfusions for the father of two minor
children); Wons v. Pub. Health Trust of Dade County, 500 So. 2d 679, 688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987), aff'd, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
149 In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 826. (The patient argued that if the court forced a woman to
undergo blood transfusions in order to prevent her from abandoning her children, it would lead
beyond blood transfusions to major medical procedure such as Cesarean sections and heart bypass
surgery).
150 Id. at 827.
151 446 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. 1983).
152 Id. at 396. A "purse string" operation involves suturing so that the cervix "holds" the preg-
nancy. Id.
153 Id. This is presumably because the woman did not have the purse string operation. See id.
154 Id. The court was presented with a letter from a physician stating that the mother needed a
purse string operation to hold the pregnancy. Id. at 396 n.2.
155 Id. at 396.
156 Id. at 397.
157 Id.
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some other factual situation that would justify a court ordering a woman to
submit to medical treatment in order to carry a child to term. 1
58
At first glance it may appear that the rules regarding forced treatment to
pregnant women vary widely among jurisdictions. However, upon taking a
closer look at the facts presented in each particular case, the outcomes do not
actually vary that much. The different conclusions in the two New York cases
clarify this point. In Jamaica Hospital, the patient was pregnant and the court
ordered the blood transfusions based on the fact that the fetus would die without
the transfusion. However, the court did not compel treatment in Fosmire, where
the woman had already given birth so the fetus was no longer completely de-
pendent on the mother.
The policy statement adopted by the American College of Obstetrics
and Gynecology states that doctors "should refrain from performing procedures
unwanted by the pregnant woman," and that "[t]he use of judicial authority to
implement treatment regimens in order to protect the fetus violates the pregnant
woman's autonomy."' 159 However, with the exception of the outcome in Taft,
most courts will force a woman to undergo medical treatment if refusal of the
treatment will directly put the fetus in danger. However, courts will be more
willing to follow the mother's wishes if the treatment decision will only directly
affect the mother.
Although these cases are helpful in determining how these jurisdictions
may come out on the specific issue of the Cesarean section, one must remember
that a Cesarean section is much more invasive than forcing a woman to undergo
a blood transfusion. In addition, most of these cases dealt with the narrow issue
of whether the woman had a religious right to refuse the medical treatment, and
courts have consistently held that the freedom of religion does not allow the
woman to harm the fetus. Although the religious freedom argument has been
presented in the Cesarean cases, courts have had to focus on other, more com-
pelling, arguments.
B. The Unique Case of the Caesarean Section
1. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority
The Supreme Court of Georgia was the first court to decide the issue of
whether a woman could refuse a Cesarean section in Jefferson v. Griffin Spal-
ding County Hospital Authority.'60 The defendant was in her thirty-ninth week
158 Id.
159 Tamar Lewin, Courts Acting to Force Care on the Unborn, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1987, at
Al. See also American Medical Association, Board of Trustees, Legal Interventions During
Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful
Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2670 (1990).
160 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
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of pregnancy and presented to the hospital for pre-natal care. 161 The examining
physician told the defendant that she had a complete placenta previa162 and that
there was almost a 100% certainty that the child could not survive natural child-
birth. 163 The defendant's chances of surviving the vaginal delivery were no bet-
ter than 50%.' 64 In addition, the examining physician opined that a delivery via
C-section would have an almost 100% chance of preserving the life of the fetus
and the defendant. 1
65
On the basis of religious beliefs, the defendant refused surgical removal
of the fetus. 166 The court framed the issue as whether the unborn fetus had any
legal right to the protection of the court. 167 The court stated that it would be a
criminal offense to abort the fetus under Georgia law. 168 The court also cited
Roe v. Wade169 in stating that a viable fetus "has the right under the U.S. Consti-
tution to the protection of the [s]tate through such statutes prohibiting the arbi-
trary termination of the life of an unborn fetus."'170 The court reasoned that
"[blecause the life of [the] defendant and of the unborn child are, at the moment,
inseparable, the [c]ourt deems it appropriate to infringe upon the wishes of the
mother to the extent it is necessary to give the child an opportunity to live."'171
As a result, the court ordered the defendant to undergo the Cesarean section.
172
2. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center,
Inc.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
came to a similar conclusion in Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional
Medical Center, Inc. 173 In Pemberton, the plaintiff was in labor and attempting
vaginal delivery at home when the hospital sought an order forcing the woman
to submit to a Cesarean section that was medically necessary in order to avoid a
substantial risk that her baby would die during delivery. 74 The state court
161 Id. at 458.
162 See infra note 14.
163 Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
170 Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 460.
173 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999).
174 Id. at 1249.
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granted the order and the physicians performed the C-section that resulted in the
birth of a healthy baby.
175
The plaintiff had previously delivered a baby via Cesarean section. The
previous Cesarean was performed using a vertical incision that extended well
beyond a traditional low vertical incision.1 76 The nature of plaintiff's prior Ce-
sarean section presented a greater risk of uterine rupture during any subsequent
vaginal delivery than would be the case with a more typical Cesarean. 77 In her
subsequent pregnancy, plaintiff searched for a physician who would allow her to
deliver vaginally, but every physician the plaintiff contacted advised her that
vaginal delivery was not an acceptable option.
78
Plaintiff made plans to deliver vaginally at home with a mid-wife.
179
However, she went to defendant hospital for intravenous (IV) fluids since she
was becoming dehydrated.180 The doctors informed plaintiff that she needed a
Cesarean, but plaintiff refused and simply requested the IV so she could return
home and deliver vaginally. 181 The plaintiff then left the hospital against medi-
cal advice.182 The hospital secured a court order requiring plaintiff to return to
the hospital and undergo the Cesarean section.
183
Plaintiff sought damages against the hospital in claiming that the forced
Cesarean violated her substantive constitutional rights, and the hospital moved
for summary judgment.' 84 Under the theory that the Cesarean section violated
her substantive constitutional rights, plaintiff asserted "a right to bodily integ-
rity, a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and a right to make important
personal and family decisions regarding the bearing of children without undue
governmental interference.' 185 Plaintiff also invoked her right to religious free-
dom.
186
Although the court recognized that the plaintiff did in fact have impor-
tant constitutional interests that were implicated by the events the hospital had
set in motion, it did not outweigh the interests of the State of Florida in preserv-
175 Id.
176 Id. The court also noted that most cesareans are performed using a horizontal incision. Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 1250.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 1251.
186 Id. The court dismissed plaintiff's freedom of religion claim as there was no showing that
the woman's beliefs were rooted in any traditional religion. Plaintiff simply argued that most C-
sections are unnecessary, but the court did not find this to be enough to support a religion claim.
Id. at 1251 n.5.
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ing the life of the unborn child.187 The court reasoned that Roe v. Wade18 8 stood
for the notion that by the point of viability, the state's interests in preserving the
life of the fetus outweighs the mother's own constitutional interest in determin-
ing whether she will bear a child.1 89 The court determined that the state's inter-
est was greater and the mother's interest less since the full-term baby's birth was
imminent and the mother sought to preserve a particular procedure, not avoid
giving birth altogether. 190 Therefore, the court found that the interests of the
state outweighed any constitutional interests of the plaintiff.191
3. In re Baby Boy Doe
The Appellate Court of Illinois came to a completely opposite result
than Pemberton and Jefferson in In re Baby Boy Doe.192 The defendant, Mother
Doe, was thirty-five weeks pregnant when medical doctors determined that the
fetus was not receiving an adequate amount of oxygen. 193 The mother refused to
undergo a Cesarean section, and the state filed a petition seeking that the hospi-
tal be appointed custodian for the fetus. 194
On appeal, the court phrased the issue as whether the court can balance
the rights of a fetus against the rights of a competent woman to refuse medical
advice to obtain a Cesarean section for the supposed benefit of the fetus. 195 The
court held that no such balancing should be employed, and that a woman's
competent choice to refuse medical treatment as invasive as a Cesarean section
must be honored, even in circumstances where the choice may be harmful to her
fetus. 1
96
The court supported its decision by relying on the well-settled law that a
competent person has the right to refuse medical treatment.' 97 The court further
stated that the right "to withhold consent and refuse treatment incorporates all
types of medical treatment, including life saving or life sustaining procedures,"
thus demonstrating that the right to refuse treatment does not depend upon
whether the treatment is perceived as risky or beneficial to the individual. 198 The
187 Id. at 1251.
188 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
189 Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1251.
190 Id. at 1251-52.
191 Id. at 1252.
192 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
193 Id. at 327.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 330.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id. (citing In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (Ill. 1989)).
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Illinois court further reasoned that religious liberty requires that a competent
adult may refuse medical treatment on religious grounds.1 99
4. In re A.C.
The District of Columbia Court Appeals had to decide a much more
complex issue in In re A. C.2° George Washington University Hospital peti-
tioned the emergency judge for declaratory relief on how it should treat its pa-
tient, A.C., who was close to death from cancer and was twenty-six and one-half
weeks pregnant with a viable fetus.201 The trial court ordered that the Cesarean
section be performed on A.C. to deliver the fetus.202 The hospital performed the
Cesarean, but the mother and the baby died within the next few days.20 3 There
was a question as to the patient's competency as she was suffering from cancer
and unconscious at the time the Cesarean section was to be performed. 204 At one
point, the patient regained consciousness and seemed to have refused to undergo
the Cesarean section.2 °5 The appellate court accepted the appeal in order to de-
cide the issue for later controversies.20 6
The court analyzed the issue under the settled law that "any person has
the right to make an informed choice, if competent to do so, to accept or forego
medical treatment., 207 The court also cited McFall v. Shimp 20 8 and Bonner v.
Moran209 for the proposition that courts do not compel one person to permit a
significant intrusion upon his or her bodily integrity for the benefit of another
person's health. 210 The court quickly dismissed any belief that the woman has an
enhanced duty toward the fetus.21 1 The court emphasized the constitutional
magnitude of the right for an individual to forego medical treatment.21 2
The court distinguished Jefferson and Anderson by stating that courts
have only overridden a patient's rights to decide her own course of treatment
199 Id. at 331 (citing In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435, 435 (111. 965)).
200 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
201 Id. at 1238.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 1239.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 1242.
207 Id. at 1243. See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-81 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (outlin-
ing the common law doctrine of informed consent).
208 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1978).
209 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
210 In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1243-44.
211 Id. at 1244.
212 See id. at 1244-45; see also In re Bryant, 542 A.2d 1216, 1218 (D.C. 1988) (examining the
issue of the common law right to accept or forego medical treatment).
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when protecting third parties, even if the third party is in a fetal state.2t3 The
court, therefore, adhered strictly to the right to refuse medical treatment and
concluded that a court may not force a woman to undergo a Cesarean section.2t 4
VI. COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE FORCED CESAREAN ISSUE
The four courts that have struggled with the forced Cesarean issue have
not conducted full analyses and each has only concentrated on a single issue.
The Jefferson court focused exclusively on the reproductive right to privacy
under Roe. Although Roe certainly must be considered in the Cesarean section
cases, courts should not limit their analysis to reproductive rights. The Jefferson
court did not make any mention of the right to refuse medical treatment, pre-
sumably because the court wanted to compel the Cesarean section but did not
want to confront the right to refuse medical treatment. Interestingly, the court
did state that the mother and child, at that moment, were inseparable. Although
this is a very important aspect of the Cesarean section cases, the court did not
expand on this issue. The recognition of the inseparable issue should have been
the focal point of the court in distinguishing the Cesarean cases from other right
to refuse medical attention cases. However, the court's failure to include any
discussion of the right to refuse medical care did not permit it to explain how the
inseparableness makes the Cesarean distinct from the other refusal of medical
care cases.
The Pemberton court struggled with the same problems as the court in
Jefferson. The court mentioned that the plaintiff had an interest in bodily integ-
rity and a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Yet, after stating these
rights, the court again focused on reproductive rights. The court did not analyze
any of the plaintiff's rights pursuant to the rights to refuse medical treatment. As
in Jefferson, the Pemberton court concentrated on the easier analysis of Roe in
determining that the state could force a pregnant woman to undergo a Cesarean
section. It is clear that both courts were eager to conclude that the state's interest
in preserving the life of the fetus outweighed the mother's interest. However,
the courts focused on reproductive rights since they did not attempt to distin-
guish the C-section case from other refusal of medical treatment cases.
In coming to the opposite decision and allowing the woman to refuse
the Cesarean section, the In re Baby Boy Doe court relied solely on the individ-
ual's right to refuse medical treatment.215  Although this analysis needs to be
considered, the court did not consider the aspect of the special relationship
formed between the mother and the fetus by the time fetus reaches viability. The
court also completely ignored any analysis regarding reproductive rights.
213 In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1246.
214 See id. at 1252.
215 In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
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The In re A. C. court also focused on the right to refuse medical treat-
ment and the right to not save another's life.216 The court cited the decision in
McFall v. Shimp217 in stating that the woman can refuse a Cesarean since she is
under no duty to save another's life. 218 The court seemed to suggest that the
situation in McFall was the exact same situation that was presented in A. C.
2 19
The court rejected any possible distinction between donating organs to another
and undergoing a Cesarean section in order to let the baby survive.22°
The four courts that have directly considered the Cesarean question
have tailored the issue in such a way as to come to the desired conclusion. The
courts that found a woman should be forced to undergo a Cesarean section
framed the analysis under reproductive rights. The courts that claim a woman is
free to refuse the Cesarean discuss the legal issues under a right to refuse medi-
cal treatment. These courts completely ignored a discussion of the issues that
were detrimental to their conclusion.
Courts should concentrate their discussion on how the maternal-fetal re-
lationship differs from simply refusing medical treatment that would injure only
the patient's life. Courts should also discuss the fact that there is a connection
between the mother and the fetus that makes the relationship inherently different
from the organ transplant cases. The Jefferson court mentioned this notion by
stating that the mother and fetus are inseparable; 22' however, the court did not
discuss the importance of this notion and also did not base its decision on this
inseparable relationship.
The courts that argued that a woman has the right to refuse the Cesarean
section as a result of the duty not to rescue have ignored the fact that there can
be a duty to rescue when there is a special relationship or if the individual
caused the underlying harm. A person may have a duty to rescue or protect an-
other if there is a special relationship between them that gives rise to an affirma-
tive duty to act.222
There is a special relationship formed between the mother and the fetus
as a result of the mother becoming pregnant. This special relationship does not
form simply by the woman becoming pregnant because the woman can elect to
have an abortion pre-viability. However, the special relationship forms once the
fetus reaches viability since the woman has refused to exercise her right to abort
the pregnancy and therefore assumes the risk of reasonably caring for the fetus
in order to safely deliver the baby. This assumption of the risk implies in it the
216 In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1243.
217 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas 1978).
21s In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1244.
219 Id.
220 Id. The court further implied that there is more of a basis to refuse a Cesarean section be-
cause a fetus cannot have rights superior to those who have already been born. Id.
221 See Jefferson v. Griffin, 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga. 1981).
222 See Hansell v. Santos Robinson Mortuary, 64 Cal. App. 4th 608, 614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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assumption that the mother may have to undergo a Cesarean section in order to
deliver the baby. Once the fetus reaches viability, therefore, a special relation-
ship forms between the mother and the fetus whereby the mother assumes the
risk that she will have to undergo a C-section in order to deliver the baby.
In Farwell v. Keaton,223 the Supreme Court of Michigan stated that an
individual has a duty to render aid to a person in peril where there is the exis-
tence of a special relationship between the parties.224 Therefore, the individual is
under a duty to render reasonable care under the circumstances.225 Similarly, in
Hutchinson v. Dickie,226 the court stated that a host had an affirmative duty to
attempt to rescue a guest who had fallen off his yacht since the host "controlled
the instrumentality of rescue. ' 227 The court reasoned that to ask of the host any-
thing less than that he attempt to rescue his guest would be "so shocking to hu-
manitarian considerations and the commonly accepted code of social conduct
that the courts in similar situations have had no difficulty in pronouncing it to be
a legal obligation.
' 228
The question of whether a duty can be owed to the fetus is illustrated by
the transformation of tort law. Prior to 1946, nearly every jurisdiction denied
recovery to children damaged in utero as a result of injury to the pregnant
mother.229 The controlling rationale was that the defendant owed no duty to a
fetus because a person was not deemed to be a "person" in existence at the time
of the injury. 230 However, by 1967, every jurisdiction maintained a cause of
action for a child injured in utero that was subsequently born alive.231 This de-
velopment has been so widespread that a few courts have held that a woman
may be liable for her prenatal negligent conduct if it harms her subsequently
born child.232
223 240 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976).
224 Id. at 221-22.
225 Id.
226 162 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1947).
227 Id. at 106.
228 Id.
229 KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 367 (5th ed. 1984).
230 Id.
231 Id. at 368.
232 See Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464, 466 (N.H. 1992) (holding that a child born alive may
maintain a cause of action against his or her mother for the mother's negligence that caused injury
to the child while in utero); Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870-71 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that a woman may be liable for taking tetracycline while pregnant). But see Chenault v.
Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. App. 1999) (holding that state law did not recognize a cause of
action in tort for injuries to a child caused by the mother's use of illegal narcotics during preg-
nancy).
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Criminal law has also witnessed an expansion of fetal rights. Several
states have imposed punishments for the crime of feticide.233 The California
legislature specifically included the killing of a fetus in its definition of mur-
der.234 The California Supreme Court ruled that a person can be sentenced to
death for killing a fetus.2 35 Child abuse statutes have also extended protection to
the fetus.236 Courts have also ordered women to carry their pregnancies to term
in jail or have seized custody of the fetuses so as to protect them from the
237
mother's drug use.
Applying this notion to the Cesarean section cases, a pregnant woman
has a duty to rescue by delivering the baby. There can be no more of a special
relationship than that between a mother and a baby, especially when the fetus is
still in utero since the fetus is completely dependent on the mother. Since there
is a right to an abortion pre-viability, the special relationship only forms after
the fetus has reached viability. After viability, the mother owes a duty to deliver
the baby as she became pregnant in the first place and then did not abort the
pregnancy after viability.
This scenario presents a completely different situation from the cases
concerning the right to refuse medical treatment and the cases dealing with the
right not to be compelled to donate organs. The right to refuse medical treatment
allows for the individual to refuse medical care when the refusal will affect only
his or her life. No right to refuse medical care cases discuss the right when dy-
ing will directly affect another human's life. Therefore, the Cesarean issue is
distinguishable from the right to refuse medical attention cases. In addition, the
Cesarean cases are different from the organ donation cases because there is no
special dependency formed by the potential donor in the organ cases. In the or-
gan donation cases the potential donor has done nothing to cause the individual
to be in his or her present predicament. However, in the Cesarean case, there is a
special relationship since the woman first got pregnant and then did not abort
the pregnancy. Therefore, the fetus is completely dependent on the woman to
carry the pregnancy to term and deliver the fetus. As a result, there is a special
relationship between the fetus and the mother, and a duty is imputed to the
mother to complete the pregnancy, even if it means the woman has to undergo a
Cesarean section.
233 See Johnson, supra note 3, at A9 (reporting that thirty-one states currently have fetal homi-
cide laws).
234 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2004) (stating that murder is the "unlawful killing of
a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought").
235 See People v. Bunyard, 756 P.2d 795, 827-830 (Cal. 1988) (holding that the act of murder-
ing a pregnant woman can qualify as multiple homicide, thus triggering the death penalty).
236 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (stating that "a child conceived but not yet born is to be
deemed an existing person").
237 See Dawn E. Johnson, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Consti-
tutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 605 (1986).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The constitutional right to privacy allows for a woman to elect to un-
dergo an abortion pre-viability and also permits an individual to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment. The right not to be compelled to rescue another
has led to the doctrine that one may refuse to donate bodily organs even if it will
save another's life. Therefore, on its face, it may appear that a woman has a
right to refuse to undergo a Cesarean section.
However, the maternal-fetal relationship is so unique that by the time
the Cesarean would be performed, a separate analysis must be considered when
a woman refuses to undergo a Cesarean section. Although reproductive rights
must be considered in the Cesarean analysis, Cesarean sections are performed at
a time when the fetus is viable outside the uterus, so at the time the woman re-
fuses the Cesarean section she does not have the constitutional right to undergo
an abortion. Additionally, the right to refuse medical treatment is close to abso-
lute, however, the right to refuse medical treatment has been substantially lim-
ited when children or fetuses may be harmed. Therefore, a woman does not have
the right to refuse a Cesarean section based on the right to refuse medical treat-
ment because the refusal would cause imminent harm to the fetus. Finally, al-
though there is no duty to rescue in American jurisprudence, there is a duty to
rescue when there is a special relationship between the parties. Because the right
to an abortion and the right to refuse medical treatment are not specifically ap-
plicable to the Cesarean issue, the major issue is whether a woman has a duty to
undergo a Cesarean section post-viability.
There is a duty for the mother to rescue the baby due to the special rela-
tionship that has formed between the mother and the fetus. Once the fetus
reaches viability and the woman has not aborted the pregnancy, the fetus is
completely dependent on the mother, and therefore there is a duty to undergo
medical procedures that give the fetus the best chance for survival. The com-
plete dependence of the fetus on the mother and the fact that the mother has
chosen to carry the baby until viability causes a distinct special relationship and
a duty for the woman to undergo the Cesarean section. Based on this special
relationship, the state can force a woman to undergo a Cesarean section only
when it is first determined by the court that the risks of vaginal birth thoroughly
outweigh the risks of undergoing the Cesarean section.
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